Sentencia del TEDH de 28 de octubre de 2025, Asunto Greenpeace Nordic y otros contra Noruega
Autora: Dra. María Pascual Núñez, Investigadora en el Centro Internacional de Estudios de Derecho Medioambiental (CIEDA-CIEMAT)
Palabras clave: Derechos Humanos. Evaluación de impacto ambiental. Protección Ambiental. Gases de efecto invernadero. Hidrocarburos.
Resumen:
La sentencia de autos resuelve la demanda presentada por Greenpeace Nordic, Young Friends of the Earth Norway y seis particulares, que alegan que la decisión de Noruega de otorgar licencias para la exploración petrolera en la plataforma continental noruega del mar de Barents vulnera los artículos 2, 8, 13 y 14 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH).
Las actoras sostienen que la concesión de 2016 se realizó sin una evaluación de impacto ambiental (EIA) adecuada, en particular respecto de las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) derivadas de la combustión del petróleo extraído, tanto en Noruega como en el extranjero. Afirman que esa omisión impide una participación pública informada y la protección efectiva de la vida, la salud y el bienestar, en especial de la juventud y de la comunidad indígena sámi. Con este fundamento, recurrieron la validez de las licencias ante los tribunales noruegos por infracción de derechos constitucionales y del CEDH.
El Tribunal Supremo noruego, en 2020, reconoció la gravedad del cambio climático, pero consideró que la valoración de impactos podía diferirse a la fase de Plan de Desarrollo y Operación (PDO) y que no concurría vicio procedimental invalidante en la concesión.
Por remisión al asunto Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz, el TEDH subraya la relevancia de sus observaciones generales sobre cambio climático, el papel de los tribunales y las cuestiones jurídicas que afloran en los litigios climáticos —causalidad, prueba, efectos del cambio climático en el disfrute de los derechos del CEDH, proporción de la responsabilidad estatal y alcance del enjuiciamiento— para descartar la existencia de vulneración del derecho a la vida del artículo 2 del CEDH.
El Tribunal analiza si se vulnera el artículo 8 del CEDH y determina que las organizaciones demandantes ostentan legitimación activa para actuar en nombre de personas afectadas por el cambio climático en Noruega. Los particulares, en cambio, no satisfacen los requisitos para ser considerados víctimas de forma individual.
La novedad reside en que, en el plano procedimental, el pronunciamiento reconoce un vínculo suficientemente estrecho entre la concesión de licencias de exploración y los efectos adversos del cambio climático sobre los derechos protegidos, pero concluye que Noruega dispone de un marco legal y procesal que, aun permitiendo diferir la EIA a la fase de PDO, garantiza una evaluación ambiental adecuada y una participación pública efectiva antes de autorizar actividades potencialmente peligrosas. Por ello, no aprecia un problema estructural ni una insuficiencia de la regulación noruega que impida la protección efectiva de los derechos del artículo 8 del CEDH, por lo que declara que no existe violación de dicho precepto.
Las alegaciones vertidas sobre la vulneración de los artículos 2, 13 y 14 del CEDH resultan inadmisibles o no son examinadas por falta de condición de víctima o por no haberse agotado los recursos internos.
Destacamos los siguientes extractos:
“(…) 281. The Court reiterates from the Grand Chamber judgment in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others (cited above, §§ 410-51) its general observations about climate change, the role of the courts in this field, and the legal issues arising in climate‑change cases, such as causation, proof, effects of climate change on the enjoyment of Convention rights, the proportion of State responsibility, and the scope of the Court’s assessment.
282. The Court further notes that the present case concerns an allegedly faulty decision-making process in one specific round of licensing of petroleum exploration, which would precede petroleum production. That is the scope of the case as determined, given the principle of subsidiarity, by the subject matter of the domestic proceedings brought by the applicant organisations against the State and which they complained about before this Court (see paragraphs 43, 44, 67 and 213 above). It follows that the general complaint against Norwegian climate or petroleum policy, namely, about certain measures of climate change mitigation, such as the omission to phase out of petroleum production from undiscovered deposits (see paragraph 212 above), is outside of the scope of the Court’s examination (contrast, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 555).
283. The Court observes, however, as did the Supreme Court during the disputed proceedings, that the challenge to the validity of the administrative decision on the 23rd round of licensing of petroleum exploration cannot be assessed in a vacuum but must necessarily be considered in the light of its cumulative consequences for petroleum policy and for the climate as a whole (see paragraphs 60 and 61 above). It follows that the present case certainly differs from the case of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others (cited above), in that it concerns the State’s procedural, rather than substantive, obligations, and is moreover limited to ten exploration licences. The case still, however, raises the issue of an alleged failure of the State to effectively protect individuals from the serious adverse effects of climate change on their life, health, well-being and quality of life. It follows that the Court’s approach in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others and the general principles elaborated in that case will guide, mutatis mutandis, its examination of the present case.
284. The Court reiterates that the applicants have formulated the same complaints in terms of both Article 2 and Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Court observes that, when examining cases involving environmental issues under Article 8, it has, to a great extent, applied the same principles as those set out in respect of Article 2. It notes that, in its recent inadmissibility decisions on applications regarding the alleged effects of climate change, the Court, sitting in committee formations, declared the applicants’ Article 2 complaints inadmissible, as being either incompatible ratione personae (see De Conto v. Italy and 32 Others (dec.), no. 14620/21, § 16, 7 May 2025 [Committee], and Uricchio v. Italy and 31 Others (dec.), no. 14615/21, § 16, 7 May 2025) or incompatible ratione materiae (see Engels and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 46906/22, § 11, 1 July 2025 [Committee]). Following the approach it took in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others (cited above, § 536), and recalling that the Court is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, the Court considers it appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, to examine the applicants’ complaints from the standpoint of Article 8 only (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018, and Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 90, 1 June 2023).
285. The Court thus considers that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicants’ complaints under Article 2 of the Convention”.
“(…) 319. In the context of petroleum production projects, the environmental impact assessment must include, at a minimum, a quantification of the GHG emissions anticipated to be produced (including the combustion emissions both within the country and abroad; compare, mutatis mutandis, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 550). Moreover, at the level of the public authorities, there must be an assessment of whether the activity is compatible with their obligations under national and international law to take effective measures against the adverse effects of climate change. Lastly, informed public consultation must take place at a time when all options are still open and when pollution can realistically be prevented at source.”
“(…) 325. Turning to the present case, the Court notes at the outset that it is not disputed that Norway has adhered to the international legal framework on climate change (see paragraph 130 above) and has devised national laws setting the requisite objectives and goals (see paragraphs 93-96 above, and compare, mutatis mutandis, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 562).
326. The Court also notes that petroleum activities in Norway are highly regulated under the framework that distinguishes three consecutive stages (see paragraph 98 above). The first stage is the opening of an area to exploration, which, under domestic law, must be preceded by a strategic environmental impact assessment conducted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and by a public consultation (see paragraphs 99-102 above). The second stage is licensing, which corresponds to the exploration phase and does not formally require any environmental impact assessment or public consultation (see paragraphs 103-107 above). The third and final stage is the PDO, which corresponds to petroleum extraction and must, in principle, be preceded by an environmental assessment conducted by the licensee, as well as by a public consultation – in certain circumstances, the requirement of an impact assessment can be waived (see paragraphs 108-115 above). The second and the third stages of the administrative procedure described above can each be judicially reviewed.”
“(…) 331. The Court notes, however, that, under Norwegian law, petroleum extraction requires authorisation and a licensee does not have a legitimate expectation that a PDO will be approved merely because it has previously held an exploration licence (see paragraphs 79 and 109 above). As stated by the Supreme Court, the authorities cannot authorise a project which is incompatible with Article 112 of the Constitution (the right to a healthy environment, see paragraph 79 above). The Supreme Court further held that a failure to assess the effects of exported combustion emissions at the strategic assessment stage could be remedied at a later procedural stage, namely, either through the environmental assessment at the PDO stage or through a general political decision to reduce petroleum activities overall (see paragraph 81 above in fine).
332. Admittedly, while the approval of a PDO requires an impact assessment, that requirement can be waived on a case-by-case basis (see paragraphs 109 and 114 above). The Court notes that several petroleum extraction projects had apparently been authorised by the Ministry without any assessment of their projected combustion emissions or their impact on climate change (see paragraphs 117-119, 255 and 256 above). The Court agrees with the applicants that a widespread use of such waivers could indeed circumvent, and, in reality, completely undermine, the very purpose of a comprehensive and timely EIA, as means of protection of the Convention rights against serious impacts of climate change on the life, health, well-being and the quality of life of individuals.
333. At this stage, and recalling the member States’ wide margin of appreciation in respect of the choice of means in this field (see Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others, cited above, § 543), the Court would, nevertheless, attach greater importance to the developments which structurally reinforce the guarantee to effectively implement the relevant procedural obligations with regard to PDOs. Those obligations are meant to ensure that before a PDO is approved there is a comprehensive EIA of the petroleum production effects on the climate, including the effects of combustion emissions in Norway and abroad.
334. The Court notes firstly that the Supreme Court clearly stated in its judgment of 22 December 2020 that the Norwegian authorities had a constitutional “obligation not to approve a PDO if the general consideration for the climate and environment at the time so indicates” (see paragraph 79 in fine, above). Secondly, the Court refers to the recent adoption of a ruling of the EFTA Court in respect of the domestic proceedings concerning three other projects, in the North Sea. The EFTA Court found that the EIA Directive required a national court to eliminate the unlawful consequences of a failure to carry out a full EIA which accounted for petroleum combustion emissions (see paragraph 161 above). Regularisation is indeed permitted by conducting an assessment while the project is under way or even after it has been completed, but only if it does not serve to circumvent the rules of EEA law and if the assessment takes a retrospective view of the environmental impact of the project (ibid.). Thirdly, the Court notes the official assurance from the Government that the climate impacts of petroleum production and combustion emissions would be assessed when any new PDO was considered, and that they would be set out in approval decisions (see paragraphs 90 and 240 above).
335. In the light of the above considerations and guarantees, the Court is satisfied that the PDO stage of the decision-making process will involve a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the anticipated petroleum production on climate change, comprising, among other things, the assessment of combustion emissions, and that informed public consultation will take place before the decision is taken (see paragraphs 318 and 319 above).
336. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is any structural problem that would undermine the conclusion that the above legal framework is being implemented effectively. There is no indication that a deferred EIA assessment is inherently insufficient to support the State’s guarantees of private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, particularly in terms of its timeliness or its contents. The Court reiterates that persons affected by the risks of climate change linked to petroleum production – and relevant associations, such as the applicant organisations in the present case – will be able to act on information obtained through an EIA in time to effectively challenge the authorisation of a project. Moreover, any assessment of GHG emissions, project by project, that would disregard the cumulative GHG emissions of all those projects combined, is prohibited under the EIA Directive (see paragraph 154 above). Lastly, the Court finds that the fact that any EIA must, by law, be based on relevant, up-to-date and sufficient information constitutes an important safeguard against any bad faith assessments prepared by licensee developers.
337. Considering the above, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention.”
Comentario de la Autora:
La sentencia de autos, pese a dictarse en un litigio contra un Estado no miembro de la UE, consolida la construcción doctrinal sobre la eventual vulneración de derechos humanos por cuestiones procedimentales de carácter ambiental que inciden en actividades económicas de alto potencial contaminante.
El TEDH reconoce que el artículo 8 del CEDH puede generar obligaciones procedimentales autónomas en materia climática, imponiendo a los Estados la realización de evaluaciones de impacto ambiental adecuadas, completas y oportunas, fundadas en la mejor ciencia disponible, incluidas las fases tempranas del proyecto —como la exploración petrolera—.
Ahora bien, al concluir que no se ha producido una violación del artículo 8 en el caso concreto, el TEDH mantiene la discrecionalidad estatal respecto de los plazos y de las formas de evaluación, siempre que se sitúen dentro de márgenes razonables.
La inadmisión de las demandas individuales por falta de pruebas médicas del daño y por no superar los criterios de exposición intensa reafirma los altos umbrales probatorios exigidos para acceder a la protección sustantiva del CEDH. Con todo, aunque el fallo no comporta condena a Noruega, refuerza de forma indirecta las garantías ambientales mediante un enfoque procedimental exigente con potencial incidencia en futuras autorizaciones de proyectos con impacto climático.
Enlace web: Sentencia del TEDH de 28 de octubre de 2025
