Sentencia del TEDH de 30 de enero de 2025, demandas acumuladas 39742/14, 51567/14, 74208/14 y 24215/15
Autora: María Pascual Núñez, Doctora en Derecho y Sociedad por la Universidad a Distancia de Madrid
Palabras clave: Derechos Humanos. Derecho a la vida. Derecho Ambiental. Contaminación. Residuos peligrosos.
Resumen:
La sentencia sobre las reclamaciones de varios particulares y organizaciones en relación con la falta de medidas efectivas por parte del Estado italiano frente a la vulneración de los artículos 2 y 8 de Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos como consecuencia de la contaminación sistemática, prolongada y a gran escala en la región de Campania, conocida como «Terra dei Fuochi». Este término, acuñado en 2003 por una organización ecologista, hace alusión a la presencia de columnas de humo tóxico en los campos agrícolas de las provincias de Nápoles y Caserta como consecuencia de la quema clandestina de residuos.
La parte actora menciona que durante más de treinta años la eliminación de residuos, incluidos residuos peligrosos, se ha llevado a cabo de forma ilegal bajo el control de grupos criminales que ofrecía servicios de bajo coste a industrias y empresas, dando lugar a una grave contaminación ambiental.
Se trata de un pronunciamiento innovador a la hora de evaluar la relación causal entre las actividades mencionadas y el resultado lesivo en la salud de las personas en los siguientes términos. En primer lugar, debe mencionarse que el Gobierno italiano alegó que el artículo 2 no podía aplicarse debido a la naturaleza multifactorial de las enfermedades invocadas y a la falta de prueba de una causalidad individual entre su exposición a los residuos y cada patología específica (perspectiva ex post). A estos efectos, afirma que la aplicabilidad del artículo 2 exige la prueba del nexo causal según la prueba del “but-for” (“de no haber sido por…”). Sin embargo, dicha prueba es prácticamente imposible de satisfacer en casos de enfermedades multifactoriales. En sentido contrario, el Tribunal, subraya que la contaminación se origina en actividades delictivas relacionadas con el tráfico de residuos, llevadas a cabo completamente al margen de cualquier marco regulador. Ahora bien, no aclara por qué considera que ese trasfondo delictivo es relevante, si bien se intuye que, debido a la mayor gravedad del contexto, frente a aquellas situaciones en las que la contaminación se deriva de actividades lícitas.
Centrando la cuestión en la interpretación jurídica de la relación causal, el Tribunal razona que el vínculo causal entre la contaminación derivada de los residuos y el aumento de enfermedades y muertes prematuras, en base a numerosas evidencias epidemiológicas, constituye una prueba suficiente para activar la aplicación del artículo 2 que las autoridades debieron tener en cuenta(perspectiva ex ante). De hecho, enfatiza que tal obligación existía desde los años noventa como resultado del principio de precaución, incluso cuando la evidencia de esos riesgos no estaba aún bien establecida. Por ello, concluye que Italia debió adoptar medidas de mitigación con mayor celeridad, para reducir así el riesgo de la población expuesta al foco de contaminación.
Este pronunciamiento constituye una sentencia piloto a la luz del artículo 46 del Convenio, e insta a Italia a implementar en un plazo de dos años una estrategia integral, mecanismos de monitoreo independientes y una plataforma pública de información ambiental.
Destacamos los siguientes extractos:
“(…) 384. The Court acknowledges at the outset that the present case differs from those environmental cases that have concerned a single, identified, circumscribed source of pollution or activity causing it, and a more or less limited geographical area (see, among other examples, López Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303; Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, ECHR 2005-IV; Giacomelli v. Italy, no. 59909/00, ECHR 2006-XII; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 53157/99 and 3 others, 26 October 2006; Tătar, cited above; Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, no. 30499/03, 10 February 2011; and Kotov and Others v. Russia, nos. 6142/18 and 13 others, 11 October 2022) or the exposure to a particular substance which is released by a clearly identifiable source (see, for example, Brincat and Others, cited above). In the present case, the Court is confronted with a particularly complex and widespread form of pollution occurring primarily, but not exclusively, on private land. As already noted, in the words of the Italian Senate, the so-called Terra dei Fuochi phenomenon is characterised by a multiplicity of sources of pollution which are very different as to their type, their geographical extension, the pollutants released, the ways in which individuals came into contact with them, and their environmental impact (see paragraph 73 above). Moreover, the Court underlines that the present case does not concern dangerous activities, such as industrial activities, carried out against the backdrop of an existing regulatory framework, as in the majority of cases that have come under its scrutiny. On the contrary, the present case concerns activities carried out by private parties, namely organised criminal groups, as well as by industry, businesses and individuals, beyond the bounds of any form of legality or legal regulation. The Court will bear these considerations in mind in its assessment of whether protective obligations under Article 2 were triggered in the present case. In this connection, it reiterates that its approach to the interpretation of Article 2 is guided by the idea that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires its provisions to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see, amongst many other authorities, Öneryıldız, cited above, § 69).”.
“(…) 388. The Court further observes that the Italian Parliament was made aware as early as 1996 by its first commission of inquiry that there were rising cancer rates in certain parts of Campania (see paragraph 10 above). In 1998, after noting an increase in cancers in the province of Caserta, the same commission of inquiry had urged that possible links between this increase and the illegal dumping of hazardous waste in that province be investigated (see paragraph 14 above). In 2004 and 2005 studies were published disclosing rising cancer incidence and mortality rates in the areas of Campania that were characterised by illegal waste disposal and the existence of illegal rubbish tips (see paragraphs 18, 19 and 21 above). Although these initial studies did not disclose a definite, direct correlation between exposure to the pollution generated by illegal waste disposal practices and the onset of certain diseases, they raised credible prima facie concerns about serious, potentially life-threatening health implications for the affected citizens, individually and collectively, into which further research was urged as a matter of priority.
- The Court cannot but observe, moreover, that in 2011 the US Navy issued precautionary measures to its personnel living and working in certain areas of the Naples and Caserta provinces, despite the noted limited availability of information from the Italian authorities and the need for further investigations on the nature and extent of environmental contamination in those areas (see paragraph 32 above).
- On the basis of the foregoing elements, and bearing in mind the particular nature of the pollution phenomenon at issue and the conduct giving rise to it (see paragraph 384 above) the Court accepts the existence of a “sufficiently serious, genuine and ascertainable” risk to life to engage Article 2 of the Convention and trigger a duty to act on the authorities’ part. The Court also accepts that the risk may be considered “imminent” in the terms established by the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 377 above) given the applicants’ residence, over a considerable period of time, in municipalities identified by the State authorities as being affected by the pollution phenomenon at issue, which had been ongoing, omnipresent and unavoidable for decades and had not ceased at the time the applications were lodged with the Court. Being satisfied that the applicants were exposed to a risk thus described, the Court does not consider it necessary or appropriate to require that the applicants demonstrate a proven link between the exposure to an identifiable type of pollution or even harmful substance and the onset of a specific life-threatening illness or death as a result of it (contrast Brincat, § 83).
- The Court further takes the view that, in line with a precautionary approach (see Tătar, cited above, § 120), given that the general risk had been known for a long time (see paragraphs 387 and 388 above), the fact that there was no scientific certainty about the precise effects the pollution may have had on the health of a particular applicant cannot negate the existence of a protective duty, where one of the most important aspects of that duty is the need to investigate, identify and assess the nature and level of the risk (see, mutatis mutandis, Kurt v. Austria [GC], no. 62903/15, § 159, 15 June 2021; also see paragraph 395 below). To find otherwise in the specific circumstances of the present case, would entail that State authorities could rely on a failure to comply or delays in complying with a duty in order to deny its very existence, thereby rendering the protection of Article 2 ineffective”.
Comentario de la Autora:
La sentencia en cuestión marca un cambio crucial en el enfoque del Tribunal respecto al requisito del vínculo causal, necesario para activar una violación del artículo 2 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, y constituye un punto de inflexión en la justicia climática y ambiental. Su enfoque es más adecuado para garantizar que la protección del derecho a la vida sea práctica y efectiva y recalca que las autoridades están obligadas a actuar con diligencia desde el momento en que tengan conocimiento de un peligro para la vida de las personas, especialmente si dicho peligro afecta a un gran número de individuos.
Enlace web: Sentencia del TEDH de 30 de enero de 2025
