7 abril 2022

Jurisprudencia al día Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ( TEDH )

Jurisprudencia al día. Tribunal Europeo de los Derechos Humanos. Azerbaiyán. Acceso a la información

Sentencia del TEDH de 9 de diciembre de 2021, demandas 19925/12 y 47532/13

Autora: María Pascual Núñez. Doctoranda en Derecho en el Centro Internacional de Estudios de Derecho Ambiental y en la Universidad a Distancia de Madrid

Palabras Clave: Derechos fundamentales. Información ambiental. Salud.

Fuente: Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos

Resumen:

El supuesto de autos versa sobre la petición de información por parte de un periodista, en relación con el impacto ambiental y sobre la salud de un radar militar en la región azerí de Gabala. La solicitud de dicha información fue denegada por el Ministerio de Salud, quien alegó no estar en posesión de la misma y remitió al solicitante a realizar de nuevo la petición ante el Gabinete de Ministros.

En septiembre de 2011, la Corte Suprema de Azerbaiyán confirmó las resoluciones del tribunal de instancia y del de apelación, en el sentido de que el Ministerio de Salud cumplió con sus obligaciones en materia de información, al facilitar a la parte actora la localización de la misma (arts. 27 y 17.2 de la Ley de Acceso a la Información nacional.

Tras reiterar su petición ante Gabinete de Ministros, a finales de 2011, el Tribunal Económico Administrativo de Bakú, consideró que el artículo 29.1 de la Ley de Acceso a la Información no obliga al titular de la información a divulgar los documentos de las comisiones creadas para un fin específico. Consecuentemente, entiende que la solicitud carece de fundamento jurídico. En sentido contrario, la actora razona que la información requerida no es información restringida sino de interés público, a efectos de la precitada Ley de Acceso a la Información. Agrega que, por razón de su profesión como periodista, precisa dicha información y por ello ejercita su derecho a recibir e impartir información (art. 10 de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos).

A la luz de estos antecedentes, el Tribunal examina si se cumplen las exigencias dimanantes del artículo 10 de la Convención. Dicho precepto no confiere automáticamente el derecho de acceso a la información, sino que este acceso debe ser instrumental para el ejercicio del derecho a la libertad de expresión y, más en concreto, a la libertad de recibir e impartir información. Por remisión a su jurisprudencia, evalúa las circunstancias particulares del supuesto en relación con: i) el propósito de la solicitud de información, que es trasladar al público cuestiones relativas al impacto ambiental y sobre la salud del radar, al realizar la labor periodística; ii) la naturaleza de la información requerida, que en este caso versa sobre un asunto que concierne al interés público; iii) el papel del solicitante, que es periodista de profesión; y iv) la disponibilidad de la información en el momento de la solicitud, nota que en este supuesto se cumple. Consecuentemente, el TEDH determina que las autoridades nacionales vulneraron el derecho del solicitante establecido en el apartado 1 del artículo 10 de la Convención.

Seguidamente, analiza si se dan las circunstancias descritas en el apartado segundo del precitado artículo 10, que justifican las eventuales limitaciones o condiciones que puedan establecerse para el derecho consagrado en el apartado 1.

La primera de ellas es que estén previstas en la ley. Sin embargo, enfatiza que su labor a la hora de revisar los marcos jurídicos nacionales es limitada, pues son los tribunales nacionales quienes mejor conocen su derecho. Lo cual no impide que el TEDH pueda entrar a analizar si las medidas adoptadas y sus efectos son coherentes con la Convención. En este sentido, menciona los casos Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia, Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine, Gorzelik and Others v. Poland y Jafarov and Others v. Azerbaijan.

A los anteriores efectos, el Tribunal determina que, de conformidad con la Ley de Acceso a la Información azerí, cuando se solicita información a una administración que no dispone de la misma, dicha administración debe solicitarla a quien la posea e informar de este extremo al interesado. Asimismo, la denegación de la solicitud de acceso a cierta información debe respetar una serie de requisitos, cuestionados por la actora ante los tribunales nacionales, pero que estos no entraron a valorar (arts. 29.1 y 23.1).

La segunda cuestión analizada, como se ha dicho, versa sobre si la información solicitada es relativa a alguna de las cuestiones mencionada en el apartado 2 del artículo 10 de la Convención, es decir, la seguridad nacional, la integridad territorial o la seguridad pública, la defensa del orden y la prevención del delito, la protección de la salud o de la moral, la protección de la reputación o de los derechos ajenos, impedir la divulgación de informaciones confidenciales o garantizar la autoridad y la imparcialidad del poder judicial. El Tribunal determina que la información peticionada no pertenece a esta categoría y, por tanto, la denegación de acceso a la información al solicitante por las dos administraciones vulnera su derecho.

Destacamos los siguientes extractos:

“(…) 44. The Court reiterates that Article 10 does not confer on the individual a right of access to information held by a public authority or oblige the Government to impart such information to the individual. However, such a right or obligation may arise where access to the information is instrumental for the individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression, in particular “the freedom to receive and impart information” and where its denial constitutes an interference with that right (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 156, 8 November 2016).

45. In determining this question the Court will be guided by the principles laid down in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (ibid., §§ 149-80) and will assess the case in the light of its particular circumstances and having regard to the following criteria: (a) the purpose of the information request; (b) the nature of the information sought; (c) the role of the applicant; and (d) whether the information was ready and available.

46. As regards the purpose of the information request and the role of the applicant, the Court notes that the applicant was a journalist at the material time and worked as an editor of Azadlıq newspaper. The applicant expressly informed the relevant State authorities that he needed the information in question as a journalist in order to analyse and report on the issues concerning the Gabala Radar Station’s environmental and public-health impact (see paragraphs 10 and 17 above). Therefore, in view of the applicant’s role and the purpose for which he sought the information in question, the Court is satisfied that the requested information was instrumental for the performance of his professional duties as a journalist.

47. As regards the nature of the information, the Court reiterates that the information to which access is sought must meet a public-interest test. The public interest relates to matters which affect the public to such an extent that it may legitimately take an interest in them, which attract its attention or which concern it to a significant degree, especially in that they affect the well-being of citizens or the life of the community. This is also the case with regard to matters which are capable of giving rise to considerable controversy, which concern an important social issue, or which involve a problem that the public would have an interest in being informed about. What might constitute a subject of public interest will, moreover, depend on the circumstances of each case (see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, cited above, § 162, with further references). In the present case, the Court considers that, by its very nature, the information requested was clearly of general public importance, as it concerned the potential impact of the radar station on the health and well-being of the population of the area where the station was located (see paragraphs 7-8 above). As such, the requested information constituted a matter of public interest.

48. Finally, in so far as the applicant sought to obtain a copy of the Commission’s report, the very existence of which has never been disputed and of which the applicant was, in fact, informed in the Ministry of Healthcare’s letter of 6 August 2010, the Court considers that the information in question was, in principle, ready and available and that the request did not pose any practical difficulties or an unreasonable burden for the authorities to gather the requested information.

49. In sum, the Court is satisfied that the information sought by the applicant, which was ready and available, constituted a matter of public interest. Access to this information was instrumental for the applicant, as a journalist, to exercise his right to receive and impart information.

50. For these reasons, Article 10 of the Convention is applicable”.

“(…) 55. Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 49-50 above, and noting that the applicant did not receive the Commission’s report, the Court considers that the domestic authorities interfered with his rights enshrined in Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.

56. The Court reiterates that an interference with an applicant’s rights under Article 10 § 1 will infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of Article 10 § 2. It should therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve those aims.”.

“(…) it appears that the domestic courts had not adequately addressed the issue of whether the Ministry of Healthcare’s response to the applicant’s first request had been compliant with Article 23.1 of the Law on Access to Information, which provided that, in situations where the State authority to which the information request had been directed was not in possession of that information, it was required to forward that request to the relevant “information owner” (see paragraph 33 above). Arguably, if it was true that the Ministry did not have the report, under that provision, the Ministry of Healthcare should have forwarded the request to the relevant authority of its own motion and should have informed the applicant about it, which was not done in the present case.

60. Nevertheless, despite the above, the applicant himself applied to the Cabinet of Ministers for a copy of the report but received no reply. In this connection, the Court notes, in particular, that Article 21.3 of the Law on Access to Information required that a refusal to provide access to information was to be made in writing and in a substantiated manner, including references to the applicable provisions of the domestic law serving as a ground for the refusal (see paragraph 32 above). Accordingly, the Cabinet of Ministers’ failure to respond to the request was in apparent breach of the above legal requirement. However, this matter was not at all addressed by the domestic courts.

61. Moreover, the Court notes that the reasoning provided by the domestic courts for dismissing the applicant’s claim against the Cabinet of Ministers was essentially confined to holding, with reference to Article 29.1 of the Law on Access to Information, that that provision “[did] not provide for an obligation of an information owner to disclose reports of commissions created for a specific purpose” (see paragraph 22 above). Accordingly, the courts found that Article 29.1 of the Law on Access to Information constituted the sole substantive legal basis for denying the applicant access to the report. For the reasons specified below, the Court cannot but agree with the applicant’s submission that, in the circumstances of the present case, this finding was based on a manifestly unreasonable interpretation and application of the domestic law.

62. In particular, having regard to the text of Article 29.1 of the Law on Access to Information, read in conjunction with Article 3.0.8 of that Law, the Court notes that it clearly concerned only the types of information which were required to be publicly disclosed by information owners of their own accord and not in response to individual requests for information (see paragraphs 26 and 34 above). In other words, it did not, as such, limit access by members of the public to State-held information. On the contrary, it facilitated such access by requiring information owners to disclose certain types of often-sought information to the public at large. Within the textual meaning of the relevant provisions of the Law on Access to Information, it appears that access to information which did not belong to the types specifically listed in Article 29.1 could be sought by way of a request for information made on an individual basis (see, inter alia, Articles 3.0.6 and 3.0.7 in paragraph 26 above, Article 10 in paragraph 28 above, and Article 29.2 in paragraph 35 above) and that the relevant information owners were required to provide such access to the person making the request, unless the requested information was lawfully restricted for access or there were other specifically defined grounds for refusing to provide access (see, inter alia, Articles 10, 20 and 21 in paragraphs 28, 30 and 31 above, respectively).

63. In the present case, the report requested by the applicant had not been publicly disclosed by the State authorities of their own accord under Article 29.1 of the Law on Access to Information. Moreover, it has never been established that it belonged to the types of information which the State authorities were required to disclose under that provision and, in fact, the courts in the present case expressly ruled that it did not”.

“(…) 65. In sum, the Court considers that it has not been demonstrated that the denial of access to the requested information by either of the two State authorities in question was in compliance with the procedural requirements of the domestic law and that no relevant substantive legal basis for such denial has been put forward either by the domestic authorities or courts or by the Government. The domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s claims against both authorities without due regard to the applicable provisions of the Law on Access to Information and, moreover, in so far as the claim against the Cabinet of Ministers is concerned, they dismissed it by having interpreted and applied the domestic law in a manifestly unreasonable manner”.

Comentario de la autora:

El pronunciamiento de autos determina que, en el marco del cumplimiento del derecho fundamental recogido en el artículo 10 de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos, debe facilitarse al solicitante la información medioambiental y sobre la salud, en relación con un radar militar. Esta sentencia permite conocer bajo qué parámetros debe analizarse la extensión de este derecho y sus eventuales límites o condiciones.

En concreto, debe establecerse cuál es el propósito de la solicitud de información, su naturaleza (si afecta a un interés público), el papel del solicitante, y la disponibilidad de la información. Ello en conjunción con que no se dé la circunstancia de que una previsión legal ‘proteja’ dicha información por razón de su materia, como expone el apartado 2 del artículo 10.

Enlace web: Sentencia del TEDH de 9 de diciembre de 2021, demandas 19925/12 y 47532/13